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Life cycle inequalityWhat do labor income dynamics look like over the life-cycle? What is the relative importance of persistent
shocks, transitory shocks and heterogeneous proﬁles? Towhat extent do taxes, transfers and the family attenuate
these various factors in the evolution of life-cycle inequality? In this paper, we use rich Norwegian population
panel data to answer these important questions. We let individuals with different education levels have a sepa-
rate income process; and within each skill group, we allow for non-stationarity in age and time, heterogeneous
experience proﬁles, and shocks of varying persistence.We ﬁnd that the income processes differ systematically by
age, skill level and their interaction. To accurately describe labor income dynamics over the life-cycle, it is neces-
sary to allow for heterogeneity by education levels and account for non-stationarity in age and time. Our ﬁndings
suggest that the redistributive nature of the Norwegian tax–transfer system plays a key role in attenuating the
magnitude and persistence of income shocks, especially among the low skilled. By comparison, spouse's income
matters less for the dynamics of inequality over the life-cycle.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the dynamics of labor income
over the working life and to explore the impact of two mechanisms of
attenuation or insurance to labor income shocks. The ﬁrst is the tax
and transfer system; the second is spouse's income. We focus on three
dimensions of inequality: individual market income, individual dispos-
able income, and family disposable income; and explore the relation-
ship between them over the life-cycle. Our objective is to provide a
detailed picture of the dynamics of inequality over the life-cycle, follow-
ing individuals from many different birth cohorts across their working
lifespan. By linking up individuals with other family members, we are
able to examine the impact of spouse's income and the role of the
tax–transfer system as mechanisms to smooth shocks to individual
market income.
There are a number of key questions addressed. What do labor income
dynamics look like over the life-cycle? What is the relative importance of
persistent shocks, transitory shocks and heterogeneous proﬁles? To whatcs, University College London,
ichael.graber.09@ucl.ac.uk
. This is an open access article underextent does the tax and transfer system attenuate these various factors in
the evolution of life-cycle inequality? What happens when we add in in-
come sources of spouses? Answering these questions has proved to be
quite difﬁcult. One problem that is often argued to hinder analysis is data
availability. While the ideal data set is a long panel of individuals, this is
somewhat a rare event and can be plagued by problems such as attrition
and small sample sizes. An important exception is the casewhere countries
have available administrative data sources. The advantages of suchdata sets
are the accuracy of the income information provided, the large sample size,
and the lack of attrition, other than what is due to migration and death.
To investigate the above questions, we exploit a unique source of
population panel data containing records for every Norwegian from
1967 to 2006. Norway provides an ideal context for this study. It sat-
isﬁes the requirement for a large and detailed data set that follows indi-
viduals and their family members over long periods of their working
career. It also has a well developed tax–transfer system, and our data
provides us with a measure of income pre and post the payment
of taxes and the receipt of transfers. To understand the role of taxes,
transfers and the family in attenuating shocks to labor income requires
amodel that allows for key aspects in the evolution of labor incomeover
the life-cycle. The extensive literature on the panel data modeling
of labor income dynamics points to three ingredients of potential
signiﬁcance: shocks of varying persistence; age and time dependencethe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
2 Like Mofﬁtt and Gottschalk (2012) and Haider (2001), Baker and Solon (2003) go be-
yond earlier models by allowing for changes over calendar time in both the persistent and
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our long panel data allows us to decompose income shocks at every age
into two components: one is mean-reverting over short periods (we
label ‘transitory’ shocks), while the other could either be permanent
or persistent and mean-reverting over long periods (we label ‘perma-
nent’ shocks). By way of comparison, the usual random walk speciﬁca-
tion would restrict the permanent shocks to be truly permanent
rather thanmerely persistent. Additionally, by followingmany different
birth cohorts across theirworking lifespanwe are able to allow aﬂexible
structure for time effects in deriving our life-cycle proﬁles.1 The size and
detailed nature of the data we are using allow us to explore the impor-
tance of these three ingredients for labor income dynamics.
Our key ﬁndings on the labor income dynamics of males are three-
fold. First, themagnitude of permanent and transitory shocks varies sys-
tematically over the life-cycle. Indeed, we may strongly reject the hy-
pothesis of age-independent variance of shocks. Second, there is
essential heterogeneity in the variances of permanent shocks across
skill groups. For low skilled, the magnitude of permanent shocks is
monotically increasing in age. For example, a permanent shock of one
standard deviation implies a 35% change in individual market income
for a low skilled 30 year old; the corresponding number for a low skilled
55 year old is 50%. High skilled, on the other hand, experience large per-
manent shocks early in life; these shocks decrease in magnitude until
age 35, after which they are relatively small and fairly stable. Third,
the variance of transitory shocks exhibits a decreasing proﬁle over the
life-cycle. While this ﬁndings holds for all skill groups, high skilled
tend to experience relatively large transitory shocks early in life.
The evidence of heterogeneity in the dynamics of labor income by
age, skill level, and their interaction motivates and guides our analysis
of the insurance from taxes, transfers and the family. We ﬁnd that the
tax–transfer system reduces both the level and persistence of shocks
to labor income. In particular, taxes and transfers lead to a remarkable
ﬂattening of the age proﬁles in the variances of permanent and transito-
ry shocks for the low skilled. At age 55, for example, a permanent shock
of one standard deviation implies a 50% change in annual market in-
come for a low skilled; the corresponding number for annual disposable
income is only 31%. After taking taxes and transfers into account,
spouse's income matters little for the dynamics of inequality over the
life-cycle.
Taken together, our results suggest that a progressive tax–transfer
system could be an important insurance mechanism to labor income
shocks, especially for low skilled. These results may have implications
for both policy and a large and growing literature on consumption in-
equality and the overall ability of families to insure labor income shocks
(see e.g. Blundell et al., 2012). Economic theory predicts that consump-
tion responds strongly to highly persistent or permanent shocks, and
empirical evidence suggests little if any self-insurance in response to
permanent shocks among individuals with no college education (see
e.g. Blundell et al., 2008). Our study points to the importance of under-
standing the nature of risk that families face over the life-cycle, and the
extent to which taxes and transfers crowd out or add to the insurance
available in ﬁnancial markets, the family or other informalmechanisms.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on modeling of labor in-
come dynamics. Identiﬁcation of credible income processes is key for
answering a number of important economic questions, including life-
cycle consumption and portfolio behavior (see e.g. Gourinchas and
Parker, 2002), the sources of inequality (see e.g. Huggett et al., 2011),
and the welfare costs of business cycles (see e.g. Storesletten et al.,
2001, 2004). The conclusions reached about these questions likely1 See, for example, the recent reviewbyMeghir and Pistaferri (2011), and the extensive
list of studies referenced therein. These studies build and extend on the original papers by
MaCurdy (1982) who developed the permanent transitory framework, Mofﬁtt and
Gottschalk (2012)who show the potential importance of time dependence in the variance
components, and Lillard andWeiss (1979) and Guvenen (2009) who established a role of
heterogeneous proﬁles.depend on the speciﬁcation of the labor income process used to cali-
brate the models. The relatively small scale of the available U.S. panel
surveys has forced researchers to rely on simple models that impose
economically implausible restrictions (see the discussions in Baker
and Solon, 2003; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011). Using rich Canadian
data from 1976 to 1992, Baker and Solon (2003) reject several of
these restrictions, including no life-cycle variation in the variance of
transitory shocks.2 DeBacker et al. (2013) use a large panel of tax returns
to study income dynamics in the U.S. over the period 1987–2009.3 Their
estimates point to the importance of allowing for time dependence in
the variance components of income.
Our study complements these studies by bringing new evidence on
several issues pertinent to modeling of income processes. One key ﬁnd-
ing is that allowing for both age and time dependence in the variance
components is essential to accurately describe labor income dynamics.
In particular, when restricting the variances of the error components
to be constant across the life-cycle, wemiss the large permanent shocks
that occur late (early) in life for the low (high) skilled. Another key ﬁnd-
ing is that allowing for heterogeneity by education levels is necessary to
capture labor income dynamics of young and oldworkers. Whenwe re-
strict the income processes at the variance level to be the same across
skill groups, we ﬁnd a U-shaped age proﬁle in the variances of perma-
nent shocks; however, this pattern is at odds with the age proﬁles of
both high and low skilled.4 By way of comparison, the dynamics of in-
come over the life-cycle change little when restricting the transitory
shocks to be uncorrelated over time or allowing for heterogeneous ex-
perience proﬁles within each skill group. Indeed, only for the high
skilled, there is evidence of signiﬁcant unobserved heterogeneity in
the income growth rates. Accounting for this heterogeneity lowers the
overall persistence of income shocks somewhat, but barely moves the
age proﬁles in the variances of permanent and transitory shocks.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents
our data and discusses institutional details. Section 3 describes our
panel data speciﬁcation for income dynamics and presents our ﬁndings
on the labor income process of males. Section 4 explores the degree of
insurance provided by taxes and transfers as well as the income of the
spouse. Section 5 offers evidence on several issues pertinent to model-
ing of income processes. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and institutional details
2.1. Data and sample restrictions
Our analysis employs several registry databases maintained by Sta-
tistics Norway that we can link through unique identiﬁers for each indi-
vidual. This allows us to construct a rich longitudinal data set containing
records for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2006. The variables captured
in this data set include individual demographic information (including
gender, date of birth, and marital status) and socioeconomic informa-
tion (including years of education, market income, cash transfers). The
data contains unique family identiﬁers that allow us to match spouses
and parents to their children.
The coverage and reliability of Norwegian registry data are consid-
ered to be exceptional (Atkinson et al., 1995). Educational attainment
is reported by the educational establishment directly to Statistics
Norway, thereby minimizing any measurement error due totransitory components of income. However, Baker and Solon (2003) do not allow for life-
cycle variation in the variance of permanent shocks. Ostrovsky (2010) extends the analysis
in Baker and Solon (2003) to the period from 1985 to 2005. See also Ostrovsky (2012),
who uses Canadian data to estimate a model which allows for separate correlation of
spouse's permanent and transitory components.
3 See also Kopczuk et al. (2010).
4 Using PSID, Karahan and Ozkan (2013) also ﬁnd a U-shaped age proﬁle in the vari-
ances of permanent shocks.
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eral advantages over those available in many other countries. First,
there is no attrition from the original sample because of the need to
ask for permission from individuals to access their tax records. In
Norway, these records are in the public domain. Second, our income
data pertain to all individuals and all jobs, and not only to jobs covered
by social security. Third, we have nearly career-long incomehistories for
certain cohorts, and do not need to extrapolate the income proﬁles to
ages not observed in the data. And fourth, there are no reporting or rec-
ollection errors; the data come from individual tax recordswith detailed
information about the different sources of income.
We study income dynamics for the 1925–1964 annual birth cohorts
during the period 1967–2006. The reason for this selection of cohorts is
to ensure fairly long records on earnings for each individual. We restrict
the sample to males, to minimize selection issues due to lower labor
market participation rates for women in the early periods. In line with
much of the previous literature, we exclude immigrants and self-
employed. We further reﬁne the sample to be appropriate for our anal-
ysis of labor income dynamics. In each year, we selectmaleswho are be-
tween the ages of 25 and 60. These individuals will likely have already
completed most of their schooling and are too young to be eligible for
early retirement schemes. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we further re-
strict the sample to individuals with at least four subsequent observa-
tions with positive market income. This restriction gives us the largest
possible sample, given that transitory shocks are assumed to follow a
ﬁrst-order moving average process.
Applying these restrictions provides uswith a panel data setwith 40
time periods and 934,704 individuals. We will refer to this as the base-
line sample. On average, this sample consists of 23,368 individuals per
birth cohort. Our model estimates age-speciﬁc variance components
from age 26 to 58. By following many birth cohorts, we are able to
allow a ﬂexible structure for calendar time effects in deriving our life-
cycle proﬁles. For the 1942–1946 cohorts, we observe income at every
age. For the cohorts born earlier (1925–1941), we miss one or more in-
come observations between the ages of 25 and 41. For the cohorts born
later (1947–1964), income is no longer observed at somepoint after age
42. As a result, our age-speciﬁc estimates are based on an unbalanced
panel of income. Appendix Fig. C.1 shows the sample size by age. The
number of observations declines late (early) in theworking lifespan be-
causewe are not observing the labor income of younger (older) cohorts
at these ages. It is therefore reassuring that themean and variance of in-
come display similar shapes over the life cycle across cohorts.
The income variables that we consider are deﬁned as follows. The
ﬁrst variable is individual market income, deﬁned as the annual pretax
earnings.5 The second variable is individual disposable income, incorpo-
rating annual earnings and cash transfers net of taxes.6 The third vari-
able is family disposable income. Our measure of family disposable
income pools the individual disposable income of the spouses (if the
male has a spouse).
Throughout the analysis, we partition the baseline sample into three
mutually exclusive groups according to educational levels. The reason is
that previous studies point to heterogeneity in the dynamics of labor in-
come by educational levels. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having com-
pleted high school (32% of the baseline sample), medium skilled
includes individual with a high school degree (48% of the baseline sam-
ple), and the high skilled consists of individuals who have attended col-
lege (20% of the baseline sample).5 Unfortunately, we are unable to measure hourly wages because we do not have data
on working hours.
6 Our measure of disposable income excludes income from ﬁnancial assets and sub-
tracts taxes on earnings and cash transfers. In every year, we compute taxes using a tax
simulation program available at Statistics Norway. Due to data availability, our measure
of cash transfers omits certain short-term and work-related beneﬁts, including sickness
pay and unemployment beneﬁts.2.2. Institutional details and descriptive statistics
Before turning to the estimation of the income processes, we de-
scribe a few important features of our data and the Norwegian setting.
We ﬁrst consider the pattern of labor market participation over the
life cycle. Appendix Fig. C.2 shows the population share of males with
positive market income by age. We see that the labor market participa-
tion rate starts out at around 90% when individuals are young. The par-
ticipation rate remains at this high level until individuals reach their
50s, at which point they start exiting the labor market at an increasing
rate. In particular, low skilled individuals are relatively likely to exit
the labor market before they can receive (early) retirement beneﬁts.
Appendix Fig. C.3 shows the levels and growth rates in market
income by the age at which individuals exit the labor market. We
see that early exits from the labor market are associated with low
and declining market income in the years prior to exit. Given the
sample restriction of non-zero market income, our baseline sam-
ple will therefore be of higher quality toward the end of the life-
cycle (especially among the low educated). This should put
downward pressure on the magnitude of shocks late in life, and
most likely give us a lower bound on the insurance from taxes
and transfers at these ages.
Next, we consider how individual market income varies over the
life-cycle in our baseline sample. Fig. 1 shows the age proﬁles in the dif-
ferent measures of income by education levels. Each market income
proﬁle displays the familiar concave shape documented and analyzed
by Mincer (1974), but the college-educated workers experience more
rapid market income growth early in the working lifespan. Fig. 2
shows the variance of log market income over the life-cycle according
to education levels. In line with the prediction of the Mincer model,
the variances of medium and high skilled have a U-shaped proﬁle.7
Among low skilled, the variance of logmarket income isweakly increas-
ing until they are in their mid 40s, after which it rises rapidly.
We then examine the extent towhich the tax and transfer system af-
fects the mean and the variance of log individual income over the life-
cycle. Fig. 1 show how the progressive nature of the tax system
dampens the income differentials between high skilled and low skilled
after age 35.8 At the same time, low skilled are more likely to receive
cash transfers while working (such as partial disability beneﬁts), espe-
cially toward the end of the working lifespan. Fig. 2 shows how the
tax–transfer system eliminates the increase over the life-cycle in the
variance of logmarket income among the low educated. By comparison,
taxes and transfers do less to the large income variance among the high
skilled early in their careers.
Lastly, we consider how family disposable income varies over the
life-cycle in our baseline sample. Fig. 1 compares the age proﬁles in
log family disposable income and log individual disposable income. In
the beginning of the working lifespan, relatively fewmales are married
and individual disposable income is therefore quite similar to family dis-
posable income.9 When the males are in their mid 30s, the vast major-
ities are married and the income of the spouse plays a more important
role. At this point, about 80% of the spouses are participating in the
labor market, thus contributing signiﬁcantly to family income.10 Fig. 2
shows the life-cycle variation in the variance of log family disposable in-
come. The family income measure displays quite similar variance over
the working lifespan as compared to the measure of individual dispos-
able income.7 Using Census data from the U.S., Heckman et al. (2003) also ﬁnd that the variance of
log labor income over the life has a U-shaped pattern.
8 The tax system is progressive throughdeductions and surtaxes. Appendix Figs. B.1 and
B.2 show the tax rates on market income in different years.
9 Appendix Fig. C.4 shows the share of the sample that ismarriedby age and educational
levels.
10 Appendix Fig. C.5 shows the labor market participation rate of the spouses by age and
educational levels.
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Fig. 1. Age proﬁles in the log of income.
Notes: This ﬁgure uses the baseline sample to show the age proﬁles in the log of income by educational levels. The age proﬁles are adjusted for education-speciﬁc calendar time
effects. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree, and high skilled consists of individuals who
have attended college.
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3.1. A panel data speciﬁcation for labor income dynamics
To understand the role of the tax and transfer system in attenuating
shocks to income for individuals and families over the life-cycle requires
a model that allows for key aspects in the evolution of labor market in-
come over the working life. As we noted in the introduction, the exten-
sive literature on the panel data modeling of income dynamics has
pointed to three key ingredients of potential signiﬁcance: shocks of
varying persistence; age and timedependence in the variance of shocks;
and heterogeneous age proﬁles. The size and detailed nature of the
Norwegian population panel allowus to combine all three of these com-
ponents and let the degree of persistence and the variance of the shocks
vary in a quite unrestricted way by age and calendar time.
Let Yi,ac denote the market income of individual i from birth cohort c
at age a. To obtain log incomenet of observable characteristics and com-
mon aggregate time trends, denoted yi,ac , we run cross-sectional ﬁrst-
stage regressions of log Yi,ac on a set of covariates.11 A panel data speciﬁ-
cation that encompasses many of the ideas in the literature is:
yci;a ¼ αci þ βci pa þ vci;a þ τci;a; ð1Þ
where αic is an individual initial condition, while βic allows for an idio-
syncratic experience proﬁle in the deterministic trend variable pa (e.g.
pa = a − 25 with a linear experience proﬁle). Taken together, these
two terms capture individual-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity in the
levels and growth rates of labor income. We allow for correlation be-
tween αic and βic.
Income shocks are decomposed into a permanent (or persistent)
component vi,ac ,
vci;a ¼ ρcvci;a−1 þ uci;a;
where ui,ac is a serial uncorrelated mean-zero shock, and a transitory
component τi,ac , which is assumed to follow a MA(1) process.
τci;a ¼ εci;a þ θcεci;a‐1;
where εi,ac is a serial uncorrelated mean-zero shock. The permanent and
transitory innovations are assumed to be independent of each other and11 In each year, we perform a separate OLS regression of log Yi,ac on a quadratic polynomi-
al in age and dummies for education, region, family size and marital status. We allow for
interactions between family size and marital status as well as interactions between the
quadratic polynomial in age and the education dummies. From these regressions, we pre-
dict log market income of individual i from birth cohort c at age a, logY^
c
i;a. The residual log
income yi,ac is given by log Yi,ac − logY^
c
i;a. By conditioning on family size and marital status
we may underestimate overall income risk.independent of αic and βic. Some examples of permanent innovations are
associated with job mobility, long-term unemployment, health shocks,
andpromotions. Transitory shocks to individual labor income typically in-
clude overtime labor supply, piece-rate compensation, bonuses, etc.; in
general, such shocks aremean reverting and their effect doesnot last long.
In Appendix A: Estimation Details, we describe every step of the es-
timation procedure for the income process given in (1). There are, how-
ever, three important features to notice. First, we allow for the
permanent component vi,ac to have a ρc coefﬁcient less than unity.
Since we have long enough panels for individuals in each of the cohorts,
the parameters of this process together with those for the transitory
process and the heterogeneous proﬁles can be separately identiﬁed.
Second, the overall persistence of shocks to the net log incomemea-
sure yi,ac depends on the weighted sum of the permanent and transitory
processes vi,ac and τi,ac respectively, where the weights reﬂect the vari-
ance share of each of these components. To see this, consider our base-
line speciﬁcation of the income process which imposes homogenous
experience proﬁles (i.e. βic = 0). Assuming that var(yi,ac ) ≃ var(yi,a + 1c ),
the ﬁrst order autocorrelation at age a
ϱca ¼
cov yci;a; y
c
i;aþ1
 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
var yci;a
 r ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
var yci;aþ1
 r
can be expressed as
ϱca≃
var αci
 þ ρc∑s¼0 ρc 2svar uci;a‐s þ θcvar εci;a 
var αci
 þ∑s¼0 ρcð Þ2svar uci;a‐s þ var εci;a þ θcð Þ2var εci;a‐1  :
This illustrates that by allowing the variances of each component to
differ by age, we are in effect, allowing the autocorrelation of income
shocks to vary quite unrestrictedly over the life cycle (even though ρ
does not depend on age).
Lastly, the use of data that follows actual cohorts over the life cycle
allows us to accurately measure their true earnings pattern and esti-
mate the labor income dynamics experienced by individuals. The
model given in Eq. (1) is estimated separately by education levels
using an equally-weighted minimum distance approach applied to
second order moments. At every age, we average the moments across
cohorts before estimating the income process.12 Without further re-
strictions, the estimates can be interpreted as an average (or a typical)
labor income dynamics experienced by these cohorts over their12 We have also estimatedmodel (1) separately for each cohort, and then computed the
weighted average of the parameters across the cohorts. Because this procedure is compu-
tationally quite costly, and the estimates are very similar, we only report results for which
the moments are averaged across the cohorts before estimation.
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Fig. 2. Age proﬁles in the variances of log income.
Notes: This ﬁgure uses the baseline sample to show the age proﬁles in the variances of log income by educational levels. The age proﬁles are adjusted for education-speciﬁc calendar time
effects. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree, and high skilled consists of individuals who
have attended college.
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relative contribution of age and calendar time effects to the labor in-
come dynamics we require further restrictions. If one were to assume
no cohort effects, we would effectively control for calendar time effects
by averaging themoments across cohorts. Heathcote et al. (2005) argue
that time effects are required to account for the observed trends in in-
equality. One might, however, suspect that cohort effects should play
some role in the distribution of ﬁxed effects. For example, rising college
enrollment rates may have changed the level of permanent wage dis-
persion of younger relative to older cohorts. We incorporate this source
of heterogeneity across cohorts by estimating the incomeprocesses sep-
arately by education levels.
3.2. Baseline estimates
We begin by considering the labor income dynamics of males. The
model given in Eq. (1) is estimated separately by education levels.13
For now,we impose homogenous experience proﬁles (βi=0) in the es-
timation.14 Instead of presenting the labor income dynamics of each co-
hort, we average the moments across the cohorts before estimating the
income process. As a result, the estimates should be interpreted as an
average (or a typical) labor income dynamics experienced by these co-
horts over their working lifespan.
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 reports the parameter estimates for indi-
vidual market income of males. For each skill group, we ﬁnd that the
persistence parameter (ρ) is either one or close to one. This suggests
that the shocks to (log) labor income can be described as the sum of a
transitory shock and a highly persistent process. Because of the unit
root, we do not identify the variance of initial conditions (var(αi)) for
the low or medium skilled.
The more persistent the shocks, the more important it is to know
whether workers at different ages face the same variance of permanent
shocks, or if the magnitude changes systematically over the life-cycle.
Fig. 3 examines this by showing the age proﬁle in the variance of perma-
nent shocks (var(ui,a)) according to education levels. The magnitude of
permanent shocks varies systematically over the life-cycle. Indeed, we
may strongly reject the standard speciﬁcation with age-independent
variance components.
Another key ﬁnding is the heterogeneity in the variances of perma-
nent shocks by education levels. For low skilled, the magnitude of per-
manent shocks is monotically increasing in age. For example, a13 Standard errors are based onnonparametric bootstrap (of each estimation stage)with
70 bootstrap replications.
14 As shown in Section 5, the persistence, magnitude, and age proﬁles of the permanent
and transitory shocks change little when we allow for heterogeneous proﬁles (βic≠ 0).permanent shock of one standard deviation implies a 35% change in in-
dividual market income for a low skilled 30 year old; the corresponding
number for a low skilled 55 year old is 50%. High skilled, on the other
hand, experience large permanent shocks early in life; these shocks de-
crease in magnitude until age 35, after which they are relatively small
and fairly stable. For example, a permanent shock of one standard devi-
ation implies a 28% change in individual market income for a high
skilled 55 years old; the corresponding number for a high skilled 28
(40) years old is 44 (22) percent.
The variance of transitory shocks, shown in Fig. 4, exhibits a decreas-
ing proﬁle over the life-cycle. While this ﬁndings holds for all skill
groups, high skilled tend to experience relatively large transitory shocks
early in life. At the same time, theMAparameter differs by skill group. A
larger proportion of the transient shocks persist for another period for
high skilled workers than for low skilled workers.
To see the importance of low incomes in determining the age pro-
ﬁles of labor market shocks, we present results in Appendix Figs. C.6
and C.7 where we exclude observations with low market incomes.15
The proﬁles are much ﬂatter. The presence of low market incomes
early and late in life is mirrored in hours of work over the life-cycle.
When looking at decennial Norwegian Census data over the period
of study, we ﬁnd that mean hours across the life-cycle is inverse
U-shaped. There is an increase until individuals are in their early 30s,
then a ﬂattening, and eventually a decrease toward retirement. The op-
posite is true for the variance of log hours, which is U-shaped. In partic-
ular, there is a sharp downward trend in the dispersion of hoursworked
before age 35.16
3.3. Model ﬁt
We now examine the performance of the model given in Eq. (1) in
ﬁtting the variance of (residual) income growth rates as well as one-
lag covariances. For each incomemeasure and every skill group,we con-
clude that the baseline speciﬁcation with homogenous proﬁles (βi=0)
and aMA(1) achieves a very goodﬁt of these keymoments over the life-
cycle.
The theoretical moments for the baseline model are given by
var Δyci;a
 
¼ ρc−1 2var vci;a−1 þ var uci;a þ var εci;a 
þ θc−1 2var εci;a−1 þ θ2var εci;a−2 15 In these ﬁgures, we exclude observations with market income lower than the basic
amount threshold of the Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme; market income above this
threshold gives eligibility for unemployment beneﬁts and matters for old-age pension
payments.
16 Kaplan (2012) documents patterns in theUS. He argues that labormarket frictions are
important in accounting for the patterns of inequality in consumption and hours over the
life-cycle.
Table 1
Parameter estimates from the model of income dynamics.
Individual market
income
Individual disposable
income
Family disposable
income
Low-skill
ρ 1.00 0.87 0.87
(0.000000) (0.006287) (0.003763)
var(αi) – 0.035360 0.034113
– (0.001234) (0.001018)
θ 0.238500 0.215220 0.207820
(0.004793) (0.004638) (0.004811)
Medium-skill
ρ 1.00 0.89 0.89
(0.000000) (0.005500) (0.004781)
var(αi) – 0.030796 0.027141
– (0.001162) (0.000899)
θ 0.258840 0.238450 0.243650
(0.0028949) (0.003982) (0.003916)
High-skill
ρ 0.98 0.94 0.85
(0.013981) (0.029910) (0.010652)
var(αi) 0.000152 0.000447 0.030992
(0.000043) (0.014922) (0.000868)
θ 0.294650 0.270220 0.278160
(0.0049582) (0.005652) (0.005665)
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from the model of income dynamics
described in Section 3.1. We use the baseline sample and estimate the model separately
by educational levels. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having completed high school,
medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree, and high skilled consists
of individuals who have attended college. Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on
nonparametric bootstrap (of both estimation stages) with 70 bootstrap replications.
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c
i;aþ1
 
¼ ρc−1 2ρcvar vci;a‐1 þ ρc−1 var uci;a 
þ θc−1 var εci;a −θc θc−1 var εci;a−1 :
Appendix Fig. C.10 shows the model ﬁt for the variance of the
growth rate, while Appendix Fig. C.11 displays the match for the one-
lag covariance proﬁle of the growth rate. We ﬁnd that the model
matches the variance of the growth rate observed in the data almost
perfectly. When ρ= 1, we effectively target the variance of the growth
rate in the estimation. As a result, the age dependence of the variances
shocks allows us tomatch the age proﬁle verywell.When ρ b 1, themo-
ments used in the estimation differ from those shown in the ﬁgure. It is
therefore reassuring to ﬁnd that the model also in this case ﬁts the data
very well.0
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ﬁdence interval is based on nonparametric bootstrap (of both estimation stages) with 704. Insurance from taxes, transfers and the family
The evidence of heterogeneity in the dynamics of labor income by
age, skill level, and their interaction raises a number of important ques-
tions. To what extent does the tax and transfer system attenuate or in-
sure the shocks to market income at different parts of the life-cycle?
Does the addition of income sources from the spouse offset or enhance
labor market shocks? In this section, we investigate these questions.
4.1. Taxes and transfers
The second column of Table 1 reports the estimation results for indi-
vidual disposable income ofmales. Importantly, the tax–transfer system
reduces the level and persistence of both the permanent and the transi-
tory shocks. The estimated persistence parameter falls the most for low
skilled; when ρ= 0.87, the effect of an income shock is reduced to 25%
of its initial value in ten years. At the same time, Figs. 3 and 4 show that
taxes and transfers lead to a remarkable ﬂattening of the age proﬁles in
the variances of permanent and transitory shocks for the low skilled. At
age 55, for example, a permanent shock of one standard deviation im-
plies a 50% change in annual market income for a low skilled; the corre-
sponding number for annual disposable income is only 31%.
Shifting attention to the high skilled,we can see that taxes and trans-
fers do little to the age proﬁle in the variance of transitory shocks. As
shown in Fig. 4, it exhibits a decreasing and convex proﬁle also in indi-
vidual disposable income; indeed, the magnitudes of the transitory
shocks are only slightly lower for disposable income than for market in-
come. The impact of taxes and transfers is somewhat larger for the var-
iance of permanent shocks. Early in life, the permanent shocks to
market income of high skilled are attenuated substantially, although
they remain large. Toward the end of the life-cycle, the tax–transfer sys-
tem reduces the magnitude of the permanent shocks somewhat.
Taken together, our results suggest that the redistributive nature of
the Norwegian tax–transfer system plays a key role in attenuating the
magnitude and persistence of income shocks, especially among the
low educated. This ﬁnding could have important implications for con-
sumption inequality and the overall ability of families to insure labor in-
come shocks. Economic theory predicts that consumption responds
strongly to permanent shocks, and empirical evidence suggests little if
any self-insurance in response to permanent shocks among individuals
with no college education (see e.g. Blundell et al., 2008).
4.2. Family income
We now shift attention to examining whether the addition of in-
come from the spouse offsets or enhances labor market shocks. There45 50 55
ge
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Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the age proﬁles in the variances of transitory shocks to income. The age proﬁles are based on themodel of income dynamics described in Section 3.1.We use the
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ﬁdence interval is based on nonparametric bootstrap (of both estimation stages) with 70 bootstrap replications.
64 R. Blundell et al. / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 58–73are competing forces at play when going from individual to family in-
come (see e.g. Blundell et al., 2012). The ﬁrst is that the variance ofmar-
ket income is relatively large among females, reﬂecting considerable
dispersion in hours worked. The second is that the stochastic compo-
nents of labor income processes are likely to be correlated across
spouses. If spouses were adopting perfect risk sharing mechanisms,
they would select jobs where shocks are negatively correlated. Alterna-
tively, assortative mating can imply that spouses work in similar jobs,
similar industries, and even in the same ﬁrm; as a consequence, their
shocks could be positively correlated. The third is that family labor sup-
ply is a possible insurancemechanism tomarket income shocks. For ex-
ample, the wife's labor supply could increases in response to negative
income shocks faced by the husband (see e.g. Lundberg, 1985). By com-
paring the dynamics of individual and family income over the life cycle,
we are able to assess the overall impact of these three factors, but not
identify the individual contribution of each factor.17
Figs. 3 and 4 display the age proﬁles in the variances of transitory
and permanent shocks to family disposable income. By comparing
these proﬁles to the ones for individual disposable income, we can see
that themagnitude of the shocks change little whenwe add the income
of the spouse. This suggests that risk sharing through (negative) assor-
tativemating or labor supply offset the high variance in income ofwives
and any positively correlated shocks. Table 1 shows that permanent
shocks remain highly persistent for low andmedium skilled, while fall-
ing for the high skilled when we add spouse's income. We can further
see that the persistence of transitory shocks change little when includ-
ing the income of the spouse.185. Investigation of income processes
This section takes advantage of the size and detailed nature of the
Norwegian data and brings new evidence on several issues pertinent
to the modeling of income processes.17 We have also estimated amodelwhich allows for separate correlation of spouse's per-
manent and transitory components. To this end,we restrict the baseline sample to couples
where both spouses have at least four subsequent observations with positive market in-
come. The estimates from this sample of dual earner couples suggest weak negative corre-
lation across spouses in the shocks to disposable income over most of the life-cycle.
However, we need to be cautious in interpreting these estimates because the labor force
participation of women is relatively low and unstable; as a result, the dual earner couples
are not representative for our baseline sample of working males.
18 Our results are not sensitive towhetherweadjust for economies of scale by employing
the usual equivalence scales. To see this, note that the log of family income is equal to the
log of the incomes of the husband and thewife, subtracted the log of the equivalence scale
(e.g. the square root of family size); the former termwill clearly dominate the latter term.5.1. Nonstationarity in age and time
Our rich panel data allows us to let the variances components de-
pend on age in an unrestricted way, while controlling ﬂexibly for calen-
dar time effects. This raises questions such as: What is missed by the
standard speciﬁcation in the literature with age-independent variance
components? How important is it to account for calendar time effects
such as the business cycle or tax reforms?
Appendix Table C.1 investigates the implications of assuming age-
independent shocks. We display the parameter estimates from a model
in which the variances of the error components in Eq. (1) are restricted
to be constant across the life cycle. For the high skilled, the estimated
persistence parameter falls from almost one with age-dependent vari-
ance of shocks to .75 with age-independent variance of shocks. By com-
parison, the age-independent speciﬁcation does not affect the estimates
of the persistence parameter for the low andmedium skilled. Figs. 5 and
6 show the misspeciﬁcation bias from restricting the variances of transi-
tory and permanent shocks to be constant over the life cycle. These ﬁg-
ures highlight the importance of allowing for age nonstationarity to
capture the labor income dynamics of low and high skilled workers.
What features of the data give rise to the misspeciﬁcation bias we
observe? Recall that high skilled have a U-shaped age proﬁle in the var-
iance of individual market income. We argue that targeting these mo-
ments with an age stationary model puts a downward pressure on ρ.
With a persistent parameter close to one, it becomes difﬁcult to match
the U-shaped proﬁle with an age-independent speciﬁcation because
the permanent shockswould then accumulate over the life cycle, gener-
ating an increasing and convex proﬁle in the variance of individualmar-
ket income.
In Fig. 7, we illustrate the importance of allowing for time
nonstationarity to get a clear picture of the typical income dynamics
over the life cycle. We estimate themodel given in (1) separately by co-
hort, and graph the age proﬁles in the variance of transitory shocks to
disposable income for different cohorts; for brevity, we do not split
the sample by education. The 5 year interval between the cohorts allows
us to clearly see the impact of a tax reform: For each cohort, we observe
a spike in the variance of transitory shocks at that the time of the change
in tax policy.19 By comparison, our baseline results control for such cal-
endar time effects by averaging the moments across the cohorts before
estimating the income process. After taking out calendar time effects,
the variance of transitory shocks exhibits a smooth and decreasing pro-
ﬁle over the life-cycle.19 The tax reform affected both the timing of income reporting and the incentives to shift
and reclassify income.
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Fig. 5.Misspeciﬁcation bias in the variance of permanent shocks to individual market income.
Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the differences in the estimated variances of permanent shocks to individual market income by age between (i) a speciﬁcation without and with linear
heterogeneous proﬁles, (ii) a speciﬁcationwithout andwith age-dependent variances of shocks and (iii) a speciﬁcationwithout andwith aMA(1) process in transitory shocks to income.
The age proﬁles are based on the model of income dynamics described in Section 3.1. We use the baseline sample and estimate themodel separately by educational levels. Low skilled is
deﬁned as not having completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree, and high skilled consists of individuals who have attended college. The age
proﬁles are adjusted for education-speciﬁc calendar time effects.
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Our ﬁndings suggest important heterogeneity in labor income dy-
namics by age, skill level, and their interaction. This raises questions
such as: What happens if we do not allow for the possibility that
individuals with different education levels face different income
processes at the variance level? How important is it to allow for un-
observed heterogeneity in the income growth rates within skill
groups?
Appendix Table C.2 displays parameter estimates from the base-
line model of income dynamics when we do not split the sample by
education. The persistence parameter in the pooled sample is one,
suggesting that the shocks to (log) labor income can still be described
as the sum of a transitory shock and a highly persistent process.
Figs. C.8 and C.9 show the age proﬁles in the variances of shocks
when we restrict the income processes at the variance level to be
the same across skill groups. Because the results from the pooled
sample mix the income processes of low and high skilled, we obtain
an inverse U-shaped age proﬁle in the variances of permanent shocks.
However, this pattern is at odds with the age proﬁles of both high
and low skilled: While the former group experience large permanent
shocks early in life, the latter group faces the largest shocks at older
ages. These ﬁndings point to the importance of allowing for heteroge-
neity by education levels to capture the labor income dynamics of
young and old workers.−
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Fig. 6.Misspeciﬁcation bias in the variance of transitory shocks to individual market income.
Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the differences in the estimated variances of transitory shocks to ind
proﬁles, (ii) a speciﬁcationwithout andwith age-dependent variances of shocks and (iii) a spec
are based on the model of income dynamics described in Section 3.1. We use the baseline s
as not having completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high scho
proﬁles are adjusted for education-speciﬁc calendar time effects.So far, we have imposed homogenous experience proﬁles (i.e.
βi = 0) within each skill group. We now relax this assumption and
allow for a linear experience proﬁle in the model given by Eq. (1).
Appendix Table C.3 displays the parameter estimates for individual
market income, while Figs. 5 and 6 show the misspeciﬁcation bias
from imposing homogenous experience proﬁles. The results suggest ed-
ucation levels do a good job in capturing heterogeneity in the dynamics
of labor income over the life-cycle. Only for the high skilled, there is ev-
idence of signiﬁcant unobserved heterogeneity in the income growth
rates; accounting for this heterogeneity lowers the persistent parame-
ter from .98 to .90, but barely moves the age proﬁles in the variances
of permanent and transitory shocks.
Appendix Fig. C.12 illustrates the heterogeneity in market income
proﬁles for the high skilled. There is a non-negligible fanning out of
the income proﬁles. At the same time, there is a negative correlation be-
tween the initial conditions and the individual-speciﬁc income growth
rate. This means that high skilled workers with relatively low market
income at age 25 (the initial age) tend to have stronger income growth
over the life cycle, offsetting some of the fanning out displayed in
Fig. C.12.
5.3. Serially correlated transitory shocks
Because we have long panel of individuals, we can separately identi-
fy a transitory process with serially correlated shocks and a permanent45 50 55
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Fig. 7. Age proﬁles in the variances of transitory shocks to individual disposable income by
birth cohort.
Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the age proﬁles in the variances of transitory shocks to individual
disposable income separately by cohort.We consider cohorts born in 1944, 1949, 1954, 1959,
and 1964. For each cohort, we estimate themodel of income dynamics described in Section 3.1.
66 R. Blundell et al. / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 58–73process which allows for a persistence parameter less than unity. In
many cases, however, this is difﬁcult because the panel of individuals
is too short (or plagued by problems such as attrition and small sample
sizes).
In Figs. 5 and 6, we examine the implications of restricting the tran-
sitory component in themodel given by Eq. (1) to be uncorrelated over
time. In the simple case of serially uncorrelated transitory shocks, all the
persistence in the income data is attributed to the permanent income
component. By comparison, the transitory component is assigned a
larger share of the total variance in our baseline model, because the
process captures short-duration persistence in the data. However, our
estimates suggest the misspeciﬁcation bias from assuming serially un-
correlated transitory shocks is relatively small compared to the biases
from ignoring heterogeneity in labor income dynamics by age and
skill level.20 Note that the (a, a+ s) element of var(Δρyic) is given by
cov Δρyci;a;Δ
ρyci;aþs
 
¼ 1−ρcð Þ;Δpa½ var γci
 
1−ρcð Þ;Δpaþs
 0
þ
var uci;a
 
þ var εci;a
 
þ θc−ρc 2var εci;a‐1 þ θcρc 2var εci;a−2 
θc−ρc
 
var εci;a;
 
−θcρcvar εci;a−1
  
− θcρcvar εci;a
  
0
if s ¼ 0
if s ¼ 1
if s ¼ 2
if sN2
:
8>>><
>>>:
.6. Conclusion
What do labor income dynamics look like over the life-cycle? What
is the relative importance of persistent shocks, transitory shocks and id-
iosyncratic trends? Towhat extent do taxes, transfers and the family at-
tenuate these various factors in the evolution of life-cycle inequality? In
this paper, we used rich Norwegian panel data to answer these impor-
tant questions.We estimated a process for incomedynamics that allows
for key aspects in the evolution of labor income over the life-cycle, in-
cluding non-stationarity in age and time, shocks of varying persistence,
and heterogeneous proﬁles.
Our estimates of the labor income dynamics of males showed that
the magnitude of permanent and transitory shocks varies systemati-
cally over the life-cycle, and that there is essential heterogeneity in
the variances of these shocks across skill groups. We found that the
redistributive nature of the Norwegian tax–transfer system plays a
key role in attenuating the magnitude and persistence of income
shocks, especially among the low skilled. Spouse's labor market in-
come, on the other hand, matters less for the dynamics of inequality
over the life-cycle.
The size and detailed nature of the data we are using also allowed us
to bring new evidence on several additional issues pertinent to model-
ing of income processes. One key ﬁnding was that restricting the age
and time dependence of the variance of income shocks can lead to
quite misleading conclusions about the income process. Another key
ﬁnding was that allowing for heterogeneity by education levels isnecessary to capture the labor income dynamics of young and old
workers. By way of comparison, the dynamics of income over the life-
cycle change little when restricting the transitory shocks to be uncorre-
lated over time or allowing for heterogeneous experience proﬁles with-
in each skill group. Indeed, only for the high skilled, there is evidence of
signiﬁcant unobserved heterogeneity in the income growth rates. Ac-
counting for this heterogeneity lowers the persistence of permanent
shocks somewhat, but barely moves the age proﬁles in the variances
of permanent and transitory shocks.
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Appendix A. Estimation details
A.1. Quasi-differences
Let Δρyi,ac ≡ yi,ac − ρcyi,a − 1c . Speciﬁcation (1) implies that
Δρyci;a ¼ αci 1−ρc
 þ βciΔρpa þ uci;a þ Δρεci;a
þ θcΔρεci;a‐1; a ¼ acmin þ 1;…; acmax;
ð2Þ
where the youngest and oldest age at which we observe cohort c is de-
noted by aminc and amaxc respectively. With Ac ≡ amaxc − aminc we can re-
write Eq. (2) in vectorized form as
Δρyci ¼ αci 1 ρc
 
ιþ βciΔρpþ uci þ Δρεci þ θcΔρLεci ; ð3Þ
where ι is a Ac × 1 vector of ones and L represents the lag-operator. The
Ac × Ac auto-covariance matrix is then given by
var Δρyci
  ¼ 1−ρc ι;Δp var γci  1−ρc ι;Δp 0 þ var uci 
þ var Δρεci þ θcΔρLεci
 
; ð4Þ
where we have used the notation γic ≡ [αic, βic]′.20
A.2. Estimation
For a given value of ρ and for each cohort c, we calculate the empir-
ical counterpart to expression (4). We then average the (a, a′)-cell of
these matrices across all cohorts that we jointly observe at age a and
age a′. Let the resulting empirical auto-covariance matrix be denoted
by var Δρyi
 b and deﬁne the stacked vector of its unique elements by
M^ ¼ vech

var Δρyi
 b :
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Fig. B.2. Average tax rates on market income in different years.
67R. Blundell et al. / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 58–73Let the parameters to be estimated be denoted by Θ. The equally-
weighted minimum distance estimator eΘ is then given by
eΘ ¼ arg min
Θ
M Θ;ρð Þ−M^
h i
M Θ;ρð Þ−M^
h i
;
whereM(Θ; ρ) are the corresponding stacked vector of theoretical mo-
ments. Since we have averaged the empirical moments across cohorts,
Θ contains the average (or typical) proﬁles of variances of permanent
and transitory shocks, var(ui) and var(εi), the moving average parame-
ter θ, an estimate for the typical variance of initial conditions var(αi),
the variance of the growth rate var(βi) and the correlation between αi
and βi denoted by ραβ. Once we have solved for eΘ for each value of ρ be-
longing to a grid, we select the estimator eΘ together with ρ that mini-
mizes the distance between the empirical and theoretical moments.21
Finally, we perform this estimation separately by education and income
measures.
Appendix B. The tax system
The Norwegian tax system is progressive through deductions and
surtaxes. Fig. B.1 shows the marginal tax rates for single earner couples
and for single persons (or dual earner couples) at the end of 2006. There
is a 7.8% social security contribution on market income. The market in-
come is taxed at a ﬂat rate of 28%; on top of that, there are two surtax
brackets adding an additional 9 and 12% to themarginal tax rates. Single
earner couples and single persons (or dual earner couples) are taxed
differently: The latter type of households only gets 50% of the standard
deduction. Over time, the Norwegian tax system has become less pro-
gressive through a series of policy changes. Fig. B.2 summarizes these
changes by displaying the average tax rates on market income over
time.21 In practice, we ﬁnd eΘ for a given value of ρ by solving a constrained nonlinear optimi-
zation problem. The inequality constraints imposed ensure positive values for variances at
any age.We further normalize the variance of transitory shocks to be constant from age 24
to age 26 and the variance of permanent and transitory shocks to be constant between
ages 59 and 60. Note that in our baseline speciﬁcation we also impose βi = 0.
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Fig. B.1.Marginal tax rates on market income in 2006.Appendix C. Additional tables and ﬁguresTable C.1
Parameter estimates from themodel of income dynamics with age-independent variance
of shocks.
Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
ρ 1.00 1.00 0.75
(0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000)
var(αi) – – 0.077078
– – (0.000753)
var(ui) 0.176590 0.128030 0.109590
(0.000786) (0.000530) (0.000736)
var(εi) 0.041355 0.026831 0.014493
(0.000470) (0.000332) (0.000500)
θ 0.289020 0.295160 0.306340
(0.003764) (0.003180) (0.009686)
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from the model of income dynamics.
We estimate the model described in Section 3.1, except for imposing age-independent
variances of transitory and permanent shocks. We use the baseline sample and estimate
themodel separately by educational levels. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having completed
high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree, and high
skilled consists of individualswhohave attended college. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are based on nonparametric bootstrap (of both estimation stages) with 70 bootstrap
replications.
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Fig. C.1. Population and sample size by age.
Notes: Using data from the period 1967–2006, this ﬁgure shows the number of observations by age for (a) all males born between 1925 and 1964 and (b) the baseline sample. Low skilled
is deﬁned as not having completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree, and high skilled consists of individuals who have attended college.
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Fig. C.2. Labor force participation rate of males by age.
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the population share of males with positive market income by age, using data from the period 1967–2006. The sample consists of males born between 1925 and
1964. In each year, we exclude immigrants and self-employed. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree,
and high skilled consists of individuals who have attended college.
Table C.2
Parameter estimates from the model of income dynamics in the pooled sample.
Individual market income Individual disposable income Family disposable income
Pooled
ρ 1.00 0.85 0.86
(0.000000) (0.004133) (0.004962)
var(αi) – 0.035644 0.031509
– (0.000483) (0.000473)
θ 0.271470 0.250870 0.251930
(0.001784) (0.002389) (0.002673)
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from themodel of income dynamics.We estimate the model described in Section 3.1. We use the baseline sample, but do not estimate
the model separately by educational levels. Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on nonparametric bootstrap (of both estimation stages) with 70 bootstrap replications.
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Fig. C.3. Levels and growth in log market income for early and late exits from the labor force.
Notes: This ﬁgure uses the baseline sample to show the levels and growth rates in logmarket income by age; we show this separately for individualswho exit and stay in the labormarket
in the subsequent year. The growth rate of earnings comes from a simple moving average over the three previous years i:e:yi;a ¼ 13∑2l¼0yi;a‐lÞ

. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having
completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree, and high skilled consists of individuals who have attended college.
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Fig. C.4. Proportion of baseline sample that is married by age and educational levels.
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Fig. C.5. Labor force participation rate of spouses by age and educational levels.
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the labor force participation rate (LFP) of the spouses by age and educational level of the husbands. Participation is equal to one if the wife has positive
labor income in a given year. This ﬁgure uses the baseline sample and, in each year, excludes individuals who are not married.
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Fig. C.6. Age proﬁles in the variance of permanent shocks to individual income when excluding individuals with low market income.
Notes: Thisﬁgure graphs the age proﬁles in the variances of permanent shocks. The age proﬁles are based on themodel of incomedynamics described in Section 3.1.We reﬁne the baseline
sample: In each year, we exclude individuals withmarket income less than one basic amount.We estimate themodel separately by educational levels. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having
completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree, and high skilled consists of individuals who have attended college. The age proﬁles are adjusted for
education-speciﬁc calendar time effects.
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Fig. C.8. Age proﬁles in the variances of permanent shocks in the pooled sample.
Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the age proﬁles in the variances of transitory shocks. The age proﬁles are based on the model of income dynamics described in Section 3.1. We use the
baseline sample, but do not estimate the model separately by educational levels. The age proﬁles are adjusted for calendar time effects. The 95% conﬁdence interval is based on
nonparametric bootstrap (of both estimation stages) with 70 bootstrap replications.
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Fig. C.9. Age proﬁles in the variances of transitory shocks in the pooled sample.
Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the age proﬁles in the variances of transitory shocks. The age proﬁles are based on the model of income dynamics described in Section 3.1. We use the
baseline sample, but do not estimate the model separately by educational levels. The age proﬁles are adjusted for calendar time effects. The 95% conﬁdence interval is based on
nonparametric bootstrap (of both estimation stages) with 70 bootstrap replications.
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Fig. C.7. Age proﬁles in the variance of transitory shocks to individual income when excluding individuals with low market income.
Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the age proﬁles in the variances of transitory shocks. The age proﬁles are based on themodel of income dynamics described in Section 3.1.We reﬁne the baseline
sample: In each year, we exclude individualswithmarket income less than one basic amount.We estimate themodel separately by educational levels. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having
completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree, and high skilled consists of individualswho have attended college. The age proﬁles are adjusted for
education-speciﬁc calendar time effects.
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Fig. C.10. Variance proﬁles or residual income growth rates.
Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the age proﬁles in the variance of the residual income growth rate. The age proﬁles are based on themodel of income dynamics described in Section 3.1 and the
empirical counterpart is calculated using the baseline sample. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a high school degree,
and high skilled consists of individuals who have attended college. The age proﬁles are adjusted for education-speciﬁc calendar time effects.
Table C.3
Parameter estimates from the model of income dynamics with heterogeneous proﬁles in market income.
Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
ρ 1.00 1.00 0.90
(0.000000) (0.000000) (0.045857)
var(αi) – – 0.026887
– – (0.032780)
var(βi) 0.000000 0.000000 0.0002773
(0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000098)
ραβ – – −0.998930
– (0.067835)
θ 0.238500 0.258830 0.293430
(0.003588) (0.002895) (0.004917)
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from themodel of income dynamics.We estimate themodel described in Section 3.1 with heterogeneous proﬁles. We use the baseline
sample and estimate the model for individual market income separately by educational levels with. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having completed high school, medium skilled includes
individuals with a high school degree, and high skilled consists of individuals who have attended college. Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on nonparametric bootstrap (of both
estimation stages) with 70 bootstrap replications.
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Fig. C.11. Covariance proﬁles of residual income growth rates.
Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the age proﬁles in the covariance of the residual income growth rate at one lag. The age proﬁles are based on themodel of income dynamics described in
Section 3.1 and the empirical counterpart is calculated using the baseline sample. Low skilled is deﬁned as not having completed high school, medium skilled includes individuals with a
high school degree, and high skilled consists of individuals who have attended college. The age proﬁles are adjusted for education-speciﬁc calendar time effects.
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Fig. C.12. Heterogeneous income proﬁles in market income among the high-skilled.
Notes: This ﬁgure graphs the heterogeneous proﬁles in individual market income for
the high skilled. High skilled consists of individuals who have attended college. The dotted
line in themiddle shows the age proﬁle for the average growth rate (β=0)The lines above
and below show age proﬁles forβ ¼  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvar βið Þp andβ ¼ 2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvar βið Þp . The proﬁles are
based on the model of income dynamics described in Section 3.1 with pa = a− 25.
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